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Changing Climate and Changing Doctrine: How
Greenhouse Gases Have Polluted the EPA’s Clean Air
Act Authority and How to Clean it up
INTRODUCTION
Discussion of climate change—or global warming, or whatever other
headline-grabbing brand-name it has most recently been given—seems
almost omnipresent in recent years. The pervasiveness of the issue is not
without good reason: According to a recent report issued by the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, overwhelming evidence
substantiates not only the occurrence of human-caused climate change, but
that the that the levels of greenhouse gases (GHGs) currently in the
atmosphere and being emitted are already having calamitous effects—
including the increased spread of infectious diseases and escalated
incidence and magnitude of droughts, floods, heat waves, and severe
storms.1 It is no wonder, then, that in the past several years the Obama
Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or “the
Agency”) made a number of forceful efforts to combat these alarming
realities.2
The EPA’s role in fighting climate change, however, is still in its
relative infancy. Although the Clean Air Act (CAA or “the Act”)3—the
statute from which the EPA gathers its authority to regulate air pollution—
was enacted in 1963, it was not until far more recently that the Agency
viewed the Act as a vehicle for dealing with the issue of climate change.
Specifically, it was the Supreme Court’s landmark 2007 decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA4 that opened—and shoved the EPA through—the
door for climate change regulation under the CAA. Massachusetts, which
centered on interpretation of the CAA term “any air pollutant,”5 is a
consequential decision not merely because it allows for more aggressive
EPA action in response to climate change, but also because it raises a wide
range of difficult interpretive questions regarding the EPA’s regulatory
authority under the statute.

Copyright 2016, by NICK KUNKEL.
1. What We Know: The Reality, Risks, and Response to Climate Change,
AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. (2014).
2. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Presidential Memorandum – Power Sector Carbon
Pollution Standards, THE WHITE HOUSE (June, 25, 2013); http://www.whitehouse
.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/presidential-memorandum-power-sector-carbonpollution-standards [https://perma.cc/424Y-E9VD].
3. See generally Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2012).
4. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
5. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
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In particular, the Massachusetts Court’s treatment of the term “any air
pollutant,” when coupled with the circumstances surrounding the most
recent amendments to the CAA and the significant need for timely climate
change regulation, leaves the extent of the EPA’s CAA authority largely
uncertain. This uncertainty has manifested in the form of two recently
decided and seemingly inapposite Supreme Court cases: EPA v. EME
Homer City Generation, L.P.6 and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA.7
In both of these cases, the Court assessed EPA constructions of the CAA
under the familiar framework of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,8 appearing
to produce equitable results in each instance. Nevertheless, the Court’s
opinions in each case differed drastically as to the level of deference
afforded to the EPA in interpreting ambiguities in the CAA. Perhaps
equally important, the Court likewise diverged as to the analytical process
it followed in each respective case.
Notably, in EME Homer, the Court emphasized a particularly textheavy, deferential mode of analysis, whereas, in Utility Air, the majority
drew on a number of non-textual factors in applying a comparatively less
deferential analytical process. Due to the nature of these holdings and their
fragile interrelation with both climate change and the EPA’s CAA
authority, resolution of their apparent conflict is imperative to the
Agency’s continued ability to regulate effectively under the Act. Given the
pressing importance of acting immediately to combat climate change, the
EPA’s ability to efficiently and effectively carry out the CAA’s statutory
mandates is perhaps now greater than ever.
This comment recommends that courts differentiate EME Homer and
Utility Air on the basis of their application to GHG-based rules versus nonGHG-based rules. Their holdings should be applied accordingly in
resolving future challenges to EPA—CAA rules. Specifically, due to the
relationship between the nature of the GHG-based rule at issue in Utility
Air, the poor fit between the CAA’s text and GHG regulations in general,
and the particular non-textual factors guiding the Court’s decision in
Utility Air, a similar process should be applied in adjudicating other
challenges to GHG-based rules. Reciprocally, the exceedingly complex
nature of many CAA provisions and the Court’s corresponding deferential,
text-based review of the challenge in EME Homer dictate that its holding
be followed in reviewing non-GHG-based rules.
Part I of this comment gives a background of the aforementioned
issues, detailing the effect that Massachusetts had on the EPA’s CAA
authority, exploring the relationship between Massachusetts and the
6. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
7. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
8. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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disparate Supreme Court guidance that followed, and explaining the
importance of resolving this conflict. Part II examines the holdings in EME
Homer and Utility Air more closely. More specifically, this section
explains the legal principles forming the backdrop of the Court’s analyses
and details the Court’s holding in each case. Part III focuses on the precise
interplay between these two conflicting holdings and discusses their
significance in the regulatory landscape. The discussion aims to
accomplish that goal by illustrating the impact of the Court’s disparate
reasoning and assessing the role of important administrative law-based
policy concerns, and how they guided the Court’s selection of seemingly
incongruent analytical processes. Finally, Part IV argues that
distinguishing Utility Air and EME Homer on the basis of their
applicability to GHG-based rules and explains why doing so alleviates
many of the related policy concerns.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Massachusetts Opens the Door for CAA-Based Climate Change
Regulation
The EPA, tasked with protecting human health and the environment,9
gathers much of its rulemaking authority from the CAA.10 However,
following the landmark Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the
precise extent of this authority has been left in a state of growing uncertainty.
In Massachusetts, the Court held that the CAA “authorize[d] EPA to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles” if the Agency “form[ed]
a ‘judgment’ that such emissions contribute to climate change.”11
More specifically, Massachusetts centered on the issue of whether the
EPA had authority under the CAA to regulate the emission of GHGs—
namely, carbon dioxide—from automobiles.12 This question, in turn, hinged
on whether the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA language “any air pollutant”
as not including carbon dioxide was a permissible construction of that term.
The EPA argued that, despite the CAA’s sweepingly broad definition of “any
air pollutant,” carbon dioxide fell outside the statute's scope on the basis of a
number of non-textual factors. Chief among these was the EPA’s belief that,
due to a lack of information regarding the issue when the CAA was most
9. Our Mission and What We Do, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 29, 2015),
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do [https://perma.cc/42ZQ
-BUAY].
10. See generally Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2012).
11. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528. See also Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521
(2012).
12. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 504.
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recently amended, Congress did not intend for climate change inducing
substances to be considered “air pollutants” within the meaning of the Act.13
The EPA further listed the political history of climate change, the sizeable
expansion of authority that would result if it construed “any air pollutant” to
include carbon dioxide, and the general difficulty in implementing a
regulatory scheme dealing with climate change inducing agents as additional
reasons for its statutory construction.14 The EPA urged reliance on these nontextual considerations with citation to FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.15 In particular, the EPA relied on Brown & Williamson for the notion
that where an issue—here, the regulation of carbon dioxide under the CAA—
holds vast political or economic significance, Congress would not have
conferred to an agency authority over that issue without clear and precise
instruction.16
While the D.C. Circuit agreed with the EPA’s argument and weighed
extratextual policy factors heavily in its decision to uphold the Agency’s
statutory construction,17 the Supreme Court did not follow suit, instead
concluding simply that “[t]he statutory text forecloses EPA’s reading.”18
As for the non-textual arguments advanced by the EPA, the Court found
“no reason, much less a compelling reason, to accept EPA’s invitation to
read ambiguity into a clear statute.”19 Ultimately, the Court held that,
should the EPA form a judgment that carbon dioxide emissions from
automobiles contribute to climate change, it would be the required to
regulate them under the CAA.20

13. See id. at 512–13.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 512 (“EPA stated it was urged on this view . . . by this Court’s decision
in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.”) (internal quotation omitted). See
also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
16. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 512 (“In essence, EPA concluded that climate
change was so important that unless Congress spoke with exacting specificity, it
could not have meant the Agency to address it.”).
17. Id. at 514 (“Judge Randolph [of the D.C. Circuit] concluded that the
[EPA’s] exercise of judgment need not be based solely on scientific evidence, but
also may be informed by the sort of policy judgments that motivate congressional
action.”). See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
18. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528.
19. Id. at 531.
20. Id. at 528–32.
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B. Massachusetts’ Implications for EPA’s CAA Authority
Upon subsequently forming such a judgment,21 the EPA issued several
expansive CAA-based rules in the following years.22 Despite seemingly
acting in accordance with express judicial authorization, the EPA was met
with a wave of litigation challenging its authority to issue many of these
rules. The problem the EPA faced stems from the fact that in 1990, when
the CAA was most recently amended, Congress did not plan for the Act,
as it was written at the time, to serve as a mechanism for dealing with the
then newly emerging issue of climate change, nor to operate as a conduit
for effecting the regulation of GHG emissions.23
The Court alluded to this in Massachusetts, but reassured the parties that
[w]hile the Congresses that drafted [the CAA] might not have
appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to
global warming, they did understand that without regulatory
flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments
would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete . . . [and that] the
language of [CAA] § 202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to
confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence.24
Although the Court was correct in its assertion that the provision at issue
allowed for flexibility, this is decidedly not the case for the entirety of the
CAA. As a result, where Massachusetts’ holding that “any air pollutant”
unambiguously encompasses GHGs intersects with inflexible portions of the
CAA, the EPA is effectively tasked with carving out square-peg regulations
and fitting them into the round holes of the CAA framework.

21. 74 Fed. Reg. 66523, 66537 (Dec. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Endangerment
Finding].
22. See e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. 48208-01 (Aug. 8, 2011) (establishing framework
for determination of emission reductions required of upwind states) [hereinafter
“Transport Rule”]; 75 Fed. Reg. 17004 (April 2, 2010) (setting out that a
regulation on motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions would trigger application
of permitting requirements to all stationary sources with the potential to emit
greenhouse gases in excess of 100 tons per year) [hereinafter “Triggering Rule”];
75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010) (setting forth final rule imposing greenhouse
gas emission standards for motor vehicles) [hereinafter Tailpipe Rule].
23. See 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922-02 (Sept. 8, 2003) (denying public petition for
regulation of GHG emissions under the CAA and explaining that “[o]nly the
research and development provision of the CAA—section 103—specifically
mentions CO2, and the legislative history of that section indicates that Congress
was focused on seeking a sound scientific basis on which to make future decisions
on global climate change, not regulation under the CAA as it was being
amended”) (emphasis added).
24. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added).
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The EPA noted this difficulty in its 2008 Advanced Notice of
Rulemaking, explaining its opinion that the CAA is “an outdated law . . . illsuited for the task of regulating global greenhouse gases.”25 Specifically, the
EPA warned that, under the framework of the CAA, the regulation of GHG
emissions from motor vehicles would likely trigger the mandatory application
of other more stringent regulations to stationary sources that emit GHGs—
unintentionally “result[ing] in an unprecedented expansion of EPA authority
that would have a profound effect on virtually every sector of the economy
and touch every household in the land.”26 Despite these concerns, the EPA
ultimately followed the Court’s directive and issued a rule regulating GHG
emissions from motor vehicles (Tailpipe Rule).27
Consistent with its earlier warnings, the EPA also provided a final
determination that the Tailpipe Rule would mandatorily trigger massive
regulations of GHG emissions from stationary sources.28 The reason for
that determination lay in the CAA mandate that stationary sources with the
potential to emit threshold levels of “any air pollutant”—a term which,
according to the Massachusetts Court, includes GHGs—be subject to
permitting requirements and emissions limitations for “each pollutant
subject to regulation” under the Act.29 Therefore, the regulation of GHG
emissions under the Tailpipe Rule, according to the EPA, triggered
application of these permitting requirements to all stationary sources with
the potential to emit GHGs in amounts above statutory thresholds.30
Though theoretically no different than other instances in which
regulation of a new pollutant triggered CAA permitting requirements,
application of these provisions to GHGs presented a major functional
problem: Despite being subject to the same statutorily mandated
thresholds, GHGs tend to be emitted in quantities “orders of magnitude
greater” than the pollutants in consideration of which these thresholds
25. 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,355 (July 30, 2008) [hereinafter Advanced Notice].
26. Id.
27. See Tailpipe Rule, supra note 22.
28. See id. Albeit somewhat unusual given its name, the Triggering Rule did
not actually trigger the application of these permitting programs. Rather, the
Triggering Rule simply represents the EPA’s final and official determination that
the Tailpipe Rule automatically and mandatorily brought GHGs within these
programs’ regulatory scope.
29. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407, 7410, 7475, 7479 (2012).
30. Triggering Rule, supra note 22. In Massachusetts, the Court merely stated
that the EPA was compelled to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles
if it formed a judgment that such emissions contributed to climate change. See
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). That is, it was the actual issuance of
such a regulation which triggered application of the stationary source permitting
schemes to sources emitting GHGs. In this regard, the Tailpipe Rule technically
produced this effect; the Triggering Rule itself simply represented the EPA’s final
and official determination of this fact.
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were established.31 The EPA warned that issuing GHG regulations in spite
of this problem would place immense burdens on industry, causing
programs designed to apply to “a relatively small number of large
industrial sources” to affect an enormous number of smaller commercial
and even residential, sources.32 According to the EPA, this would leave
the programs both unadministerable and “unrecognizable to the Congress
that designed” them.33 The EPA thus set out to mitigate these problems,
issuing a rule which sought to “tailor” these regulations to GHGs by
implementing, inter alia, a “phase-in” approach to their application.34
Despite the EPA’s concern and attempts to address the problems
underlying these regulatory programs, a number of parties filed petitions
challenging the EPA’s authority to pass these rules shortly thereafter.35
These challenges soon began to resemble a laundry list.36
The Court’s conspicuous inconsistency in its resolution of two of these
challenges in particular highlights the current uncertainty regarding the
Agency’s rulemaking authority under the CAA: While in EPA v. EME
Homer, the Court employed a methodology that emphasized strict textual
construction of the CAA provision at issue,37 it instead weighed a number
of non-textual considerations in applying what appeared to be an overall
“reasonableness” inquiry in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA.38 In fact,
31. Advanced Notice, supra note 25, at 44,498–99.
32. Id.
33. 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,555, 31,562 (June 3, 2010) [hereinafter Tailoring
Rule]. The EPA quantified this broad expansion, estimating that the number of
sources subject to the regulations would increase “from the current 280 sources
per year to almost 82,000 sources.”
34. Id. at 31,523–25. This approach allowed for the regulations to take effect
gradually, allowing temporary exemptions of varying lengths for certain sources,
and reserved the possibility that the EPA may allow permanent exemptions in
some instances. Additionally, the EPA noted that it would undergo additional
rulemaking to “take further action to address [problems regarding] small sources.”
35. See Coalition for Responsible Regulation, et al. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102
(D.C. Cir. 2012). Many of these petitions were filed just days after the
promulgation of the rules they challenged.
36. Lee Logan, States Novel Suit Over ESPS Settlement Faces Procedural
Challenges, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY REPORT, Aug. 8, 2014, (detailing several suits
in which the EPA’s authority under the CAA has been challenged). See, e.g.,
White Stallion Energy Ctr. v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (challenging
the EPA’s authority to issue a rule creating national standards for emissions from
power plants); EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014)
(challenging the EPA’s authority to pass Transport Rule).
37. See EME Homer, 134 S. Ct.at 1601, for one of many examples of such
methodology (“The practical difficulties cited by the Court of Appeals do not
justify departure from the Act’s plain text”) (emphasis added).
38. See Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2444, for an example of one of these “other”
considerations (noting the “economic and political significance” of the regulation
in determining whether an EPA interpretation of the CAA deserved deference).
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EME Homer had explicitly rejected many of the bases for the Court’s
decision in Utility Air. Because of the acuteness of this conflict and its
relationship to the urgent need to combat climate change through CAAbased regulation, it must be resolved with the utmost judicial care.
The weightiness of the impact that this conflict holds the potential to
produce owes itself to the inherent complexity of both the CAA and the
issue of climate change in general,39 as such complexities tend to increase
the likelihood of statutory ambiguity.40 Moreover, the CAA is complex
both in a technical, scientific sense41 and in a structural sense.42 Because
these aspects of the CAA promote ambiguity with respect to the EPA’s
regulatory authority under the Act, the extent of the EPA’s authority is
inextricably linked to—and tremendously impacted by—the level of
judicial deference given to the agency’s interpretations of ambiguous
provisions.43 The inherent relationship between agency authority and
39. See Advanced Notice, supra note 25, at 44,365 (explaining that
determining “how to regulate GHG emissions [under the CAA] while considering
. . . the Nation’s energy and economic security . . . is enormously difficult,” and
explaining that doing so would require “an enormously elaborate, complex,
burdensome, and expensive regulatory regime”).
40. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 2071, 2089, n.89 (1990) (“Statutory terms [often] offer ambiguous
guidance to agencies that must establish regulations in complex areas” and
emphasizing that these complexities oftentimes create scenarios where “a
statutory term is ambiguous with regard to the particular problem [it was designed
to prevent]”); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)(explaining the
increased need to “reconcil[e] conflicting policies” where statutes are complex
and technical).
41. See Advanced Notice, supra note 25 at 44,366 (explaining that many
CAA provisions require “interpretation of statutory terms and the application of
technical or scientific data and judgment”). See also, Chevron, 467 U.S.at 2793
(noting that the CAA’s “regulatory scheme is technical and complex”); EME
Homer, 134 S. Ct.at 1595–1597 (detailing difficulty in construing particular CAA
provisions and noting that “EPA conducted complex modeling” in an effort to
resolve the issue).
42. See Sunstein, supra note 40 (noting that one of the “characteristic
problems in modern regulation” is the fact that “[o]ften the regulatory process is
confounded by the difficulty of coordinating numerous statutes with one
another”). Cf. supra Part I.B (detailing a portion of the CAA’s framework);
Triggering Rule, supra note 22 (explaining that regulating emissions under certain
CAA provisions triggers mandatory application of additional regulations under
other portions of the Act); Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427
(2014)(discussing the interplay of these “triggering” provisions). These aspects of
the Act’s complex nature and their relation to underlying concerns regarding
administrative law and climate change are discussed, infra, in further detail.
43. See generally Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 529 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “the singularly judicial role
of marking the boundaries of agency choice . . . did not die with [Chevron],” and
that the presence of statutory ambiguity does “not [mean] that courts should cease
to mark the bounds of delegated agency choice”) (internal citation omitted).
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judicial deference underlines the importance of resolving the
aforementioned jurisprudential tension with particular care. Such a
resolution—whether beneficial or detrimental—will directly impact both
the present and the future of the EPA’s ability to regulate effectively under
the CAA. And given the importance of the underlying objective at stake—
combating climate change—the EPA’s ability to regulate is perhaps more
important now than ever.
II. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO
AGENCY LAW PRINCIPLES
A. The Legal Backdrop
To understand the significance of the conflict between EME Homer
and Utility Air in relation to the future of the EPA’s regulatory authority,
it is first necessary to understand its significance in relation to the
underlying administrative doctrines in play.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, a seminal case in administrative law,
established the two-step framework courts use to review an agency’s
construction of a statute it administers.44 Chevron sets out a two-step
process for adjudicating challenges to agency rules.45 First, the reviewing
court must determine whether the particular statutory provision is, in fact,
ambiguous.46 If the court determines that the text of the statute gives a
clear answer to the precise question at issue, “that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.”47 If instead the court finds that the provision
is silent or ambiguous with respect to that issue, the court must then
determine “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”48 So long as the agency’s interpretation
represents a permissible construction of the statute, it is given dispositive
effect.49 At Chevron’s core is the notion that “considerable weight should
be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory
scheme it is entrusted to administer.”50 Accordingly, an agency’s “view
governs if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute—not necessarily
44. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).The impact of Chevron
in the administrative arena is vast and ever present. See Sunstein, supra note 40
(explaining the importance and notoriety of Chevron, reckoning that “Chevron is this
generation’s Erie”).
45. Chevron, 467 U.S.at 842.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 842–43.
48. Id. at 843.
49. Id.
50. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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the only possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation deemed most
reasonable by the courts.”51 Despite its ubiquity in the realm of
administrative law, however, the precise doctrine established in Chevron
remains hotly debated.52
First, with respect to the very analytical procedure called for by
Chevron, some legal scholars have argued that the separation of its central
inquiry—whether an agency’s statutory construction is entitled to
deference—into two discrete steps is both artificial and ill-advised. In
particular, administrative law scholars Matthew Stephenson and Adrian
Vermule take the position that Chevron’s “two-step structure causes
material confusion among commentators and courts, with harmful
consequences for administrative law doctrine.”53 In the view of
Stephenson and Vermule, “[r]ather than trying to breathe life into each of
Chevron’s two steps, judges, scholars, and teachers of administrative law
should jettison the two-step framework and acknowledge that Chevron
calls for a single inquiry into the reasonableness of the agency’s statutory
interpretation.”54
Second, there is scholarly disagreement as to Chevron’s exact scope
and the precise level of deference to which an agency’s interpretation is
entitled when that interpretation involves a “major question.”55 This so51. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 (2009) (first emphasis
added).
52. See, e.g. Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency
Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 229 n.116 (1994) (quipping “[t]he loss of forests necessary to
make the paper to print all of the articles written on the proper standard of review in
interpreting statutes following [Chevron] might well have justified requiring the
Supreme Court to issue an environmental impact statement along with the opinion”).
53. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95
VA. L. REV. 597, 598 (2009).
54. Id.
55. See Doug Williams, A Harder “Hard Case”, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 931, 944 –
946 (2013) (detailing scholarly disagreements over the so-called “major questions
exception” to Chevron). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV.
187, 193 (2006) (coining the phrase “major questions exception”). Some scholars are
of the opinion that the major questions doctrine triggers a complete inapplicability of
Chevron—that is, it answers the question asked at “Chevron step zero”—while others
hold that it simply influences the inquiry at step one of Chevron. Compare, e.g.,
Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to Chevron
Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got it
Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593 (2008) (examining the exception as applicable at
“step zero”), with Sunstein, supra, at 248 (“MCI and Brown & Williamson, [the cases
giving rise to the exception] . . . are best read as Step One cases”). For the purposes of
this comment, it is of no matter where, within Chevron’s framework, the major
questions exception comes into play. Ironically, in the iteration of the exception
relevant to this comment, the Court cites Brown & Williamson in its assessment of
Chevron’s second step. See Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
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called “major questions” exception to Chevron emanates from FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.56 In Brown & Williamson, the Court
explained that its “inquiry into whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue”—that is, its determination of whether the
statute at issue is ambiguous—“is shaped, at least in some measure, by the
nature of the question presented.”57 The Court reasoned that “Congress
could not have intended to delegate a decision of [considerable] economic
and political significance to an agency [ambiguously],” relying for support
on the facts that the agency interpretation at issue was “[c]ontrary to its
[prior] representations to Congress” and that Congress had created a
separate scheme effecting the same nature of regulations at issue.58
Especially given the fact that some scholars argue that the major questions
exception was rejected by the Court in Massachusetts,59 these principles
hold particular importance with regard to the matter at hand.
Indeed, the debate surrounding the separation of Chevron’s inquiry
into two distinct steps and the debatable vitality of the major questions
exception are each matters on which the Court has recently given disparate
holdings. In Utility Air and EME Homer, the Court seemed to employ
contrasting levels of distinction between Chevron’s two steps.
Additionally, while the Court employed a black-letter form of Chevron in
EME Homer—prioritizing strict statutory construction and demonstrating
a reluctance to consider non-textual factors—it utilized a “looser” form of
Chevron in Utility Air, seemingly breathing new life into Brown &
Williamson’s major questions exception by emphasizing many of the very
same non-textual factors it rejected in EME Homer. The dichotomy
between the Court’s more traditional Chevron analysis and its modified
“Chevron-lite” becomes readily apparent upon a detailed reading of these
two opinions.

56. See generally, Brown & Wiliamson, supra note 15.
57. Id. at 160.
58. Id. at 159.
59. See, e.g. Moncrieff, supra note 55, at 594 (“In Massachusetts v. EPA . . .
the Court dealt a fatal blow to a fledgling, though controversial, doctrine: the
“major questions” exception to Chevron deference”).
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B. Dueling Chevron Standards in EME Homer and Utility Air
In both EME Homer and Utility Air, the Court specified unequivocally
that Chevron was the doctrinal framework guiding its analysis.60 These
nods to Chevron make the Court’s seeming inconsistencies in its
application not only puzzling, but all the more important. A detailed
reading of these decisions reveals important analytical wrinkles and
inconsistencies that bear directly on the future of the EPA’s CAA
authority.
1. Traditional Chevron in EME Homer
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation involved a challenge to the
EPA’s authority to issue the Transport Rule, the Agency’s latest attempt
to delineate the scope of the CAA’s “Good Neighbor Provision.”61 The
Good Neighbor Provision requires each state to submit to the EPAa State
Implementation Plan (SIP), which must contain “adequate provisions” to
eliminate emissions that “contribute significantly” to nonattainment of
EPA pollution standards in any other state.62 If, upon review, the EPA
finds a particular State’s SIP inadequate, the Agency will then issue the
state a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP), which the state is thereafter
bound to follow.63 Under the Transport Rule, emissions by upwind states
are deemed to “contribute significantly” to downwind nonattainment to
the extent that the upwind state’s exported pollution (1) produces one
percent or more of the threshold pollution level in a downwind state, and
(2) can be eliminated cost-effectively, as determined by the EPA.64 The
issue in EME Homer was whether the EPA had reasonably concluded that
it was not required to quantify a state’s regulatory obligations under the
Transport Rule before issuing the state a FIP, and whether the Agency’s
consideration of cost was reasonable in defining what emissions
“contribute significantly” to downwind nonattainment.65

60. See Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2439 (“We review EPA’s interpretations of
the Clean Air Act using the standard set forth in Chevron”); EME Homer, 134 S.
Ct. at 1604 (noting that “Chevron . . . is the path making decision and it bears a
notable resemblance to the case [at hand]”) (internal citation omitted).
61. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1593.
62. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (2012). See also EME
Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1593–95 (explaining in detail these CAA provisions). More
specifically, the aforementioned “pollution in any other state” refers to emissions
which “contribute significantly” to nonattainment in downwind states.
63. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1).
64. Transport Rule, supra note 22.
65. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1598–99.
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The D.C. Circuit held that the rule exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority
on both of these grounds.66 As to the first issue, the court based its conclusion
largely on the impracticability of applying the Transport Rule as written. The
court argued that under the rule, “a State’s only chance to avoid a FIP is to
make a successful stab in the dark,” and held that these difficulties created an
implicit statutory exception to the plain text of the Good Neighbor
Provision.67 In the D.C. Circuit’s view, the Good Neighbor Provision required
that the EPA must first “define[] or quantif[y] a State’s good neighbor
obligation” and then give “the State . . . a reasonable time to implement that
requirement with respect to sources within the State” before the Agency was
permitted to issue the State a FIP.68 Further, finding also that the EPA’s
consideration of costs in setting states’ “Good Neighbor” obligations was
unreasonable, the D.C. Circuit opined that the Good Neighbor Provision
required “[d]istributi[on of] those obligations in a manner proportional to
[each state’s] contributions.”69 Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court
disagreed with both of these holdings.70
On the former issue, the Court concluded simply that “the text of the
statute supports EPA’s position[,]”71 emphasizing the definitive language of
the CAA provision at issue.72 Overturning the judgment of the D.C. Circuit
on this basis, the Court explained that “[h]owever sensible (or not) the Court
of Appeals’ position, a reviewing court’s ‘task is to apply the text [of the
statute], not to improve upon it.’”73 The Court reiterated that “[t]he practical
difficulties cited by the Court of Appeals do not justify departure from the
Act’s plain text.”74 The Court also explicitly rejected the argument that the
Transport Rule was unreasonable because it did not comport with prior EPA
decisions to quantify States’ regulatory obligations before issuing FIPs,
explaining that, “[w]hatever pattern the Agency followed in its [past rules],
EPA retained discretion to alter its course.”75
On the second issue, the Court likewise upheld the EPA’s
interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provision as permitting consideration
of costs in defining what amounts of emissions “contributed significantly”
66. EME Homer, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
67. Id. at 37.
68. Id. at 31.
69. Id. at 21–22. It is worth reiterating that the D.C. Circuit’s construction of
the Good Neighbor Provision indeed differed significantly from that provided by
the EPA in the Transport Rule.
70. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1600, 1603.
71. Id. at 1600.
72. Id. (quoting Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)).
73. Id. at 1600–01 (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,
Div. of Cadence Industries Corp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989)) (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 1601.
75. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1601–02.
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to downwind nonattainment, stressing that an agency’s interpretation of
ambiguous statutory language is entitled to deference as long as it is
reasonable, regardless of whether it is the particular construction a
reviewing court might find most reasonable.76 The Court cautioned that
“[w]hen ‘Congress has not directly addressed the precise [interpretive]
question at issue,’ . . . a reviewing court cannot ‘simply impose its own
construction o[f] the statute.’”77 Elucidating this warning, the Court
pointed to the fundamental imprecision of addressing such a scientifically
and technically complex issue as an indication that the “EPA must have
leeway in fulfilling its statutory mandate.”78
Undeniably, the Court’s analysis in EME Homer followed the
Chevron framework unwaveringly. The Court explicitly observed
Chevron’s two-step process, drawing a clear distinction between the
questions of whether the statute was ambiguous and whether the EPA’s
interpretation of the ambiguity was reasonable.79 Furthermore, at each of
Chevron’s two steps, the Court addressed the precise considerations
associated with traditional Chevron analysis.80 First among these, the
Court applied a strict and straightforward textual analysis of the contested
76. Id. at 1603 (emphasizing the similarity of the issue at hand to that
considered in Chevron). See also Entergy, 556 U.S at 218 (“[An agency’s] ‘view
governs if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute—not necessarily the only
possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation deemed most reasonable by the
courts’”).
77. Id. at 1603 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
78. Id. at 1609. The Court made particular note of the complex modeling the
EPA conducted prior to formulating the Transport Rule. Id. at 1596. The Court
explained that, “[b]ecause ‘a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy
. . . depend[s] upon more than ordinary knowledge’ of the situation,” courts should
be hesitant to overturn an agency’s decision in such an circumstance. Id. at 1603
(quoting U.S. v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)).
79. See id. at 1593 (“Satisfied that the Good Neighbor Provision does not
command the Court of Appeals’ cost-blind construction,” i.e., satisfied that the
statute is ambiguous (Chevron’s first step), “and that EPA reasonably interpreted
the provision,” i.e., the EPA’s interpretation was reasonable (Chevron’s second
step), “we reverse the D.C. Circuit’s judgment”) (emphasis added). As to the
question of whether the EPA was required to give quantitative guidance before
issuing FIPs, the Court decided the issue at Chevron’s first step. Id. at 1601
(“[T]he statute speaks without reservation”). Conversely, in determining whether
the EPA was permitted to consider costs in formulating regulatory requirements
under the Good Neighbor Provision, the Court decided the issue at Chevron’s
second step. See id. at 1606 (“Persuaded that the Good Neighbor Provision does
not dictate [a] particular allocation of emissions . . . we must next decided whether
the allocation method chosen by EPA is a permissible construction of the
statute.”) (internal quotation omitted).
80. See Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive
Methodologies, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1971, 1972 (2007) (“Descriptive statistics reveal
that textualism and legislative intent are most common.”).
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provision, noting throughout its opinion that the plain text of the statute
supported the EPA’s interpretation, 81 and that the statutory language took
precedence over any practical concerns82 or alternative readings advanced
by the circuit court.83 Next, the Court assessed Congress’s intent in
drafting the statute. The Court reasoned that, “[h]ad Congress intended [to
require the EPA to give additional time before issuing a FIP], Congress,
we take it, would have included a similar direction in that section,”84 and
“[b]y altering the schedule Congress provided by SIPs and FIPs, the D.C.
Circuit . . . allowed a delay Congress did not order and placed an . . .
obligation on EPA [which] Congress did not impose.”85 Taken together,
these analyses reflect Chevron’s core premise: “that it is for agencies, not
courts, to fill statutory gaps.”86
2. Modified-Chevron, in Utility Air
In stark contrast to the Court’s decision in EME Homer, the Utility Air
majority strayed from Chevron’s beaten path. There, as in EME Homer,
the Court explicitly noted that it was applying Chevron in reaching its
decision.87 However, aside from this ostensible doctrinal nod, the Court’s
reasoning in Utility Air was largely devoid of typical Chevron inquiries,
seeming instead to favor a different analytical method.
Utility Air involved challenges to the EPA’s authority to issue several
GHG-related rules Under the CAA,88 specifically, the Triggering Rule89
and the Tailoring Rule.90 The dispute presented two distinct issues:
namely, whether the EPA permissibly determined (1) “that a source may
be subject to the [CAA’s] PSD and Title V permitting requirements on the
81. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1600.
82. Id. at 1601.
83. Id. at 1600, 1603.
84. Id. at 1601.
85. Id.
86. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs. 545 U.S.
967, 982 (2005). See also Sunstein, supra note 55, at 190 (“[Chevron’s] grant of
[interpretive authority to agencies] seemed to depend on a distinctive account of
legal interpretation, one that sees resolution of statutory ambiguity as involving
judgments of principle and policy and insists that the executive, not the courts,
should make those judgments”).
87. See Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2439 (“We review EPA’s interpretations of
the Clean Air Act using the standard set forth in Chevron.”)
88. Id. at 2438.
89. See Triggering Rule, supra note 22 (representing the EPA’s final
judgment that the regulation of GHG emissions from motor vehicles would trigger
the application of PSD and Title V permitting requirements to stationary sources
with the potential to emit threshold levels of GHGs).
90. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 33 (modifying and delaying the effects of
the permitting programs to sources which emitted GHGs).
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sole basis of the source’s potential to emit greenhouse gases [above
relevant statutory thresholds],” and (2) “that a source already subject to
the [permitting] program because of its emission of conventional
pollutants (an ‘anyway’ source) may be required [under the program] to
limit its greenhouse-gas emissions.”91
The first of these two challenges focused on the EPA’s interpretation
of the language “any air pollutant” in relation to CAA provisions requiring
stationary sources with the potential to emit threshold levels of “any air
pollutant” to comply with certain permitting requirements.92 Under the
EPA’s interpretation of this language, GHGs fell within the purview of
“any air pollutant” once they became regulated under the CAA via the
Tailpipe Rule.93 In turn, stationary sources would become subject to the
PSD and Title V permitting programs on the basis of their potential to emit
GHGs above the statutory threshold and, additionally, all the programs’
requirements would become applicable to GHG emissions.94 The D.C.
Circuit upheld those rules, finding the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA
provisions at issue to be “compelled by the statute.”95 The Supreme Court
91. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2438. These issues identified by the Court
represent two separate questions each of which arose primarily out of the
challenge to the Triggering Rule. The Court’s consideration of the Tailoring Rule,
because it served essentially as an addendum of sorts to Triggering Rule, was
subsumed by the former of the two questions. See id. at 2444–45. Additionally, in
analyzing the first question presented, although the Court individually addressed
the permissibility of the Tailoring Rule, the analysis therein is not relevant to the
discussion at hand. In quickly (and correctly) disposing of the rule, the Court
wasted no words pointing out that “[i]t is hard to imagine a statutory term less
ambiguous than the precise numerical thresholds [at issue],” and that, by replacing
specifically enumerated amounts of 100 and 250 tons with 100,000 tons, the EPA
clearly “went well beyond the bounds of its statutory authority.” Id. at 2445
(internal quotation omitted).
92. See id. at 2439. This language appears in two separate CAA permitting
programs. The first program, contained in the Act’s Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) provisions, applies to new stationary sources. Clean Air Act,
supra note 2, at §§ 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C) (making it unlawful to construct or
modify a “major emitting facility” in “any area to which [the PSD program]
applies” without a permit) (emphasis added). This provision applies to new
sources with the potential to emit 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant” (i.e., to
“major emitting facilit[ies]). Id. § 7479(1) (defining “major emitting facility”).
The second program, set out in Title V of the CAA, requires existing stationary
sources with the potential to emit 100 tons per year of “any air pollutant” to obtain
permits as well. Id. §§ 7661a(a) (making it unlawful to operate any “major
source” without a permit), 7661(2)(B) (defining “major source”). All relevant
analytical distinctions between these programs is noted in this comment.
93. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2437. See also Tailpipe Rule, supra note 22.
94. See Triggering Rule, supra note 22.
95. Id. See Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102,
133–34 (2012) (the D.C. Circuit’s decision).
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disagreed,96 but despite its acknowledgment that Chevron controlled its
inquiry, it reached this conclusion based on reasoning which departed from
Chevron’s recommended course of “employing traditional tools of
statutory construction.”97 In fact, the Court based its decision in Utility Air
almost exclusively on non-textual factors, implicating issues regarding
Massachusetts and the major questions exception to Chevron.
The Court’s citation to Brown & Williamson is crucial in
understanding the precise nature of this logical pattern.98 Most notably, the
Court employed language directly from Brown & Williamson to
accentuate its proposition that
[w]hen an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an
unheralded power to regulate “a significant portion of the
American economy,” [courts] generally greet its announcement
with a measure of skepticism. [Courts] expect Congress to speak
clearly if it wishes to assign an agency decisions of vast “economic
and political significance.”99
The doctrinal principles espoused in this passage are important for two
reasons. First, they essentially embody the major questions exception
exactly as it was understood prior to Massachusetts—and exactly as the
Court rejected it in that holding. The Utility Air Court seemingly endorsed
Brown & Williamson’s modified approach to Chevron by emphasizing the
notion that agency interpretations are subject to enhanced scrutiny when
they potentially implicate profound real-world impacts. Second, these
precepts effectively authorize the Court to appraise certain non-textual
factors the consideration of which Chevron does not traditionally
contemplate. Accordingly, the considerations that most strongly
influenced the outcome of Utility Air emanated largely from beyond the
text of the CAA—and represent many of the same factors that the EPA
urged the Court to consider in Massachusetts.
First among these non-textual factors was the nature of the EPA’s
“earlier and later pronouncements” interpreting the phrase “air pollutant.”
96. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2439.
97. Chevron, 467 U.S.at 843 n.9.
98. See Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2441, 2443–44.
99. Id. at 2444 (quoting Brown & Williamson, supra note 15, at 159) (internal
citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Brown & Williamson language quoted by
the Court is particularly notable for its striking similarity to comments made by
the EPA and others regarding the Triggering Rule. See, e.g. Advanced Notice,
supra note 25, at 44,355 (the EPA warning that the Triggering Rule “would have
a profound effect on virtually every sector of the economy and touch every
household in [America]”); id. at 44,360 (Council on Environmental Quality
expressing concern that the Triggering Rule would affect “a vast range of
community and business activity”).
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The Court emphasized that in past pronouncements the EPA had restricted
its interpretation of the term “any air pollutant” to any regulated air
pollutant—a definition more narrow than the CAA-wide definition that
Massachusetts specifically held incorporated GHGs.100 Although this
particular construction of the term would still include GHGs, the Court
reasoned that, because the EPA had previously narrowed its interpretation
of “any air pollutant” to fit its desired regulatory effect, it could do so
again, chiding the Agency in its statement that “[i]t takes some cheek for
EPA to insist that it cannot possibly give ‘air pollutant’” a more narrow
meaning “in the PSD and Title V contexts when it has been doing precisely
that for decades.”101 The Court pointed to various instances where prior
EPA interpretations of the language “any air pollutant” had limited
construction of the term to fit the Agency’s regulatory goals.102 The
Court’s emphasis of this point both comports with and serves to highlight
the proposition for which the Court cited Brown & Williamson: that courts
must examine more closely agency interpretations that hold potentially
vast political and economic significance.
Furthermore, the Utility Air Court gave considerable weight to the
real-world difficulties that would result from upholding the Triggering
Rule as a reasonable construction of the CAA. Confirming the impact this
impracticability had on its decision, the Court opined, “[T]he fact that
EPA’s greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation of the PSD and Title V
triggers would place plainly excessive demands on limited governmental
resources is alone a good reason for rejecting it.”103 Among these demands,
the Court noted that the EPA’s rule would result in an increase of the
regulation’s annual administrative costs from $77 million to over $22.5
billion and force an enormous number of newly covered sources to comply
with permitting requirements, placing significant “procedural burdens on

100. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2439–40.
101. Id. at 2440.
102. Id. The alternative interpretations listed by the Court construed “any air
pollutant” to mean “air pollutants for which EPA has promulgated new source
performance standards,” 36 Fed. Reg. 24,877 (1971), “pollutants for which the
area is designated nonattainment,” 45 Fed. Reg. 52,745 (1980), “regulated
pollutants,” 62 Fed. Reg. 54,941 (1997), and “visibility-impairing air pollutants,”
62 Fed. Reg. 54,941 (1997).
103. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2444. The Court seems to suggest that certain
methods could potentially alleviate some of these procedural concerns,
specifically lamenting the fact that it had not been “given [specific details] about
the ability of other possible ‘streamlining’ techniques by EPA—such as ‘general’
or ‘electronic’ permitting—to reduce the administrability problems identified [by
the Court].” Id. at 2444 n.7.
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the permitting authority and EPA.”104 Moreover, despite “constitut[ing] an
‘unprecedented expansion in EPA authority that would have a profound
effect on virtually every sector of the economy and touch every household
in the land,’” the Court felt that the Triggering Rule would nevertheless
“be ‘relatively ineffective at reducing greenhouse gas concentrations.’”105
Providing further support for its invalidation of the Triggering Rule, many
of the Court’s precise concerns were echoed in comments from numerous
executive branch agencies, including, inter alia, the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation, and Energy.106
These bases for the Court’s conclusion fall directly in line with Brown
& Williamson. Because the “EPA’s interpretation . . . would bring about
an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority
without clear congressional authorization,” the Court found that “it would
be patently unreasonable . . . for EPA to insist on seizing [such] power.”107
Yet ambiguous provisions where Congress has given no clear direction are
precisely the gaps that Chevron does call on agencies to fill. This
jurisprudential paradox makes evident the Court’s apparent departure from
traditional Chevron analysis on Utility Air’s first issue.
Turning to “whether EPA’s decision to require BACT [best available
control technology]108 for greenhouse gases emitted by sources otherwise
subject to PSD review” [wa]s . . . a permissible interpretation of the
statute,”109 the Court did not change its analytical process. In fact, on this
second issue, the Court weighed factors essentially identical to those
compelling its judgment on the first issue.
First among these considerations, the Court cited the regulation’s
consistency with the earlier and later EPA pronouncements as grounds for
104. Id. These numbers represent the aggregate costs under the PSD program
(increasing from $12 million to over $1.5 billion) and under Title V (increasing
from $62 million to $21 billion).
105. Id. at 2436.
106. Id. at 2436 n.2. These other government bodies included the Council of
Economic Advisers, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Council on
Environmental Quality, and the Small Business Administration.
107. Id.
108. BACT is “an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of
reduction” that is “achievable . . . through application of production processes and
available methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels,
or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques.” Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7479(3). BACT is determined “on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs.” Id.
109. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2448. To clarify, at issue was the EPA’s
determination that sources that would already be subject to the PSD permitting
program based on their emissions of conventional pollutants (i.e., sources subject
to the program based on their emission of pollutants other than GHGs) would be
required to comply with BACT standards for GHGs.
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upholding the rule, twice making note of the Agency’s prior
determinations regarding BACT requirements for anyway sources.
Dismissing the petitioners’ concerns that the regulation risked paving the
way for the EPA to seize unbounded regulatory authority, the Court
highlighted the fact that the “EPA ha[d] long interpreted BACT as required
only for pollutants that the source itself emits.”110 Second, the Court
emphasized that “[t]here [was] no indication . . . that EPA ha[d]
[previously] interpreted [the relevant statute] to mean anything other than
what it says.”111
Also consistent with its adjudication of the first issue, the Utility Air
Court stressed the practical effects of the EPA’s statutory construction.
Specifically, the Court pointed out that the EPA had published a guidance
document that clearly addressed and assuaged many—if not all—of the
practical concerns cited by the petitioners as evidence that the EPA’s
judgment on the issue was unreasonable.112 The Court explained that the
document plainly recommended less burdensome considerations than
those petitioners argued were impermissible.113 Moreover, according to
the Court, “the record before us does not establish that the BACT provision
as written is incapable of being sensibly applied to greenhouse gases.”114
On those grounds, the Court concluded that the EPA’s decision to require
BACT for GHGs was reasonable.115
Upon careful examination of the majority opinion in Utility Air, the
Court’s departure from Chevron’s analytical framework becomes readily
apparent. Whether intentionally or not, the Court not only divorced its

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. For example, petitioners argued “that EPA may never require BACT for
greenhouse gases” because “applying it to greenhouse gases will make it more about
regulating energy use, which will enable regulators to control every aspect of a
facility’s operation and design, right down to the light bulbs in the factory cafeteria.”
Id. at 2447 (internal quotations omitted). Speaking directly on this issue, the EPA
explained “that BACT analysis should consider options other than energy efficiency,”
and “BACT should not require every conceivable change that could result in minor
improvements in energy efficiency, such as the aforementioned light bulbs.” Id. at
2448 (internal quotations omitted). According to the Court, the EPA’s guidance
evinced the “long . . . held [notion] that BACT cannot be used to order a fundamental
redesign of [a] facility.” Id. (citation omitted).
113. Id. (“The guidance document explains that permitting authorities should
consider whether a proposed regulatory burden outweighs any reduction in
emissions to be achieved”).
114. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2439.
115. Id. at 2438 (“Even if the text were not clear, applying BACT to
greenhouse gases is not so disastrously unworkable, and need not result in such a
dramatic expansion of agency authority, as to convince us that EPA’s
interpretation is unreasonable.”)
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reasoning from the plain meaning of the statutory language at issue116—the
foremost consideration at step one of Chevron—but in fact seemed to forego
Chevron’s two-step framework altogether. Despite the Court’s nominal
indications that it was transitioning from Chevron’s first step to its second,117
no bona fide distinction exists between its analyses at either part.118 Perhaps
as a result of the commingling of Chevron’s two steps, the Court, in lieu of
direct inquiry into the actual meaning of the statutory language, instead
focused most pointedly on the likely effects of the EPA’s interpretation, the
impracticability of the rule’s implementation, and the relationship between the
statutory construction at issue and prior EPA interpretations of similar
provisions. As a result, the Court’s analysis essentially collapsed into a singlestep, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry into the regulation’s general
reasonableness. The relationship between this methodology and that
employed by the Court in EME Homer holds vast importance for the future
of the EPA’s regulatory authority under the CAA.

116. See id. at 2449 n.2 (explaining that GHGs “are indisputably a ‘pollutant
subject to regulation,’”—a category of substances narrower than the category
“any air pollutant” with respect to which the Court found the EPA’s GHGinclusive construction unreasonable) (emphasis added).
117. See id. at 2442 (“Having determined that EPA was mistaken in thinking
the Act compelled [its] interpretation of the PSD and Title V triggers, we next
consider the Agency’s alternative position that its interpretation was justified as
an exercise of its discretion to adopt a reasonable construction of the statute”)
(internal quotations omitted); id at 2448 (“Even if the text were not so clear,
applying BACT to greenhouse gases is not so disastrously unworkable . . . as to
convince us that EPA’s interpretation is unreasonable.”).
118. Compare id. at 2438–42 (considering, at Chevron’s first step: the EPA’s
prior interpretations of the term “any air pollutant;” the particularly “elaborate,
burdensome” nature of the permitting scheme that would result from the
Triggering Rule; the “incompatib[ility of] inclusion [of GHGs] with th[e]
programs’ regulatory structure;” and the fact that “greenhouse gases[] are emitted
in such vast quantities that their inclusion [in the permitting programs] would
radically transform those programs and render them unworkable as written”) with
id. at 2442–46 (considering, at Chevron’s second step: the EPA’s prior
determinations “that applying the PSD and Title V permitting requirements would
be inconsistent with . . . the Act’s structure and design;” the “incompatib[ility of
the rule] with the substance of Congress’ regulatory scheme;” the imposition of
“a complicated, resource-intensive, time-consuming . . . process suitable for
hundreds of larger sources” on “tens of thousands of smaller sources;” and the
extension of rules which “cannot rationally be extended beyond a relative handful
of large sources capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural
burdens” to these thousands of smaller sources).
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III. THE CONFLICT IN THE COURT’S CLEAN AIR ACT DOCTRINE
Even a quick skim of the Court’s opinions in EME Homer and Utility Air
makes evident, at the very least, their sweeping theoretical divergence. This
discord is of particular import, as it serves to illustrate the significance that
traditional policy concerns underlying administrative law doctrine hold in the
context of climate change regulation. But the conflict between the Court’s
textual and non-textual analyses does not merely implicate a theoretical
debate devoid of any real-world impacts; the difference in the methodologies
applied in the two cases directly impacted their outcome.
A. The Effect of the Conflict on the Outcome of EME Homer and Utility Air
To understand the extent of the impact that these distinct methodologies
hold for the future of the EPA’s CAA authority, it is first necessary to
understand the tremendous impact these differences have already had.
Comparative analysis of EME Homer and Utility Air makes readily apparent
the far-reaching influence of their inconsistencies.
1. EME Homer, Under an Overall Reasonableness Standard
In EME Homer, the Court adhered fairly strictly to the traditional
Chevron approach and, as a result, ultimately upheld the EPA’s Transport
Rule as a permissible construction of the CAA.119 But what if the Court had
followed a line of reasoning more similar to that employed in Utility Air?
What if the Court, instead of assessing the Transport Rule under Chevron’s
two discrete steps, had collapsed its analysis into a single inquiry of the overall
reasonableness of the EPA’s statutory construction? And, what if the Court in
EME Homer had gone beyond the considerations traditionally associated with
Chevron analysis and instead emphasized the same non-textual factors that
guided its decision in Utility Air?
Simply put, application of Utility Air’s methodology would have
produced the opposite result. In fact, nearly all of the reasoning that formed
the basis of the Court’s decision in EME Homer fails under the standards set
forth in Utility Air.
First, in the line of logic weighing most heavily on the Court’s
determination that the EPA was not required to give states quantitative
instruction or a subsequent implementation period before issuing FIPs, the
Court rebuffed the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the potential ineffectiveness
119. See supra text accompanying notes 80–86 (pointing out that the Court
broke its analysis into two discrete steps and addressed the major Chevron
considerations explicitly).
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and impracticability of the Transport Rule compelled an alternative
interpretation of the statute.120 In contrast, the Utility Air majority specifically
cited similar practical difficulties pertaining to the EPA’s Triggering Rule as
compelling evidence that the EPA should have tailored its interpretation.121 In
fact, Utility Air seems to go so far as to imply that, in the presence of such
difficulties, an agency may sometimes be required to stray from the plain
meaning of statutory text in order for for its interpretation to be considered
“reasonable”122—a direct contradiction of the holding in EME Homer.123 Had
this reasoning been applied in EME Homer, it is clear that the Court would
have found that the Transport Rule represented an unreasonable interpretation
of the CAA’s Good Neighbor Provision.124 Accordingly, the Court would also
have likely favored a statutory construction more in keeping with that set out
by the D.C. Circuit, as that interpretation accounted for and sought to alleviate
problems with the Transport Rule’s functional applicability.125

120. See EME Homer, 134 S. Ct.at 1601 (“The practical difficulties cited by the
Court of Appeals do not justify departure from the Act’s plain text”); id. (rejecting the
lower court’s supposedly more functional construction of the statute because
“[h]owever sensible (or not) the Court of Appeals’ position, a reviewing court’s task
is to apply the text [of the statute], not to improve upon it”).
121. See, e.g., Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2442 (giving reasons the EPA ought to have
“use[d] ‘air pollutant’ to denote . . . only those [substances] that may sensibly be
encompassed within the particular regulatory program”).
122. See id. at 2439–40 (explaining that, despite the fact that “the Act-wide
definition [of air pollutant] includes greenhouse gases,” in the PSD and Title V
context, non-GHG inclusive “interpretations [a]re appropriate[ because i]t is plain as
day that the Act does not envision an elaborate, burdensome permitting process for
major emitters of [substances such as GHGs]”); id. at 2440 (placing in the category of
“appropriate,” more narrow constructions of “any air pollutant,” even “[]though these
limitations are nowhere to be found in the Act-wide definition”). This implication is
even more obvious given the fact that the Court held the EPA’s construction of “any
air pollutant” unreasonable specifically on the grounds that its inclusion of GHGs
would “render [the permitting programs] unworkable as written.” Id. at 2442.
123. Cf. id.; EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1601 (“The practical difficulties cited by
the Court of Appeals do not justify departure from the Act’s plain text.”).
124. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (“The fact that EPA’s greenhouse-gas-inclusive
interpretation of the PSD and Title V triggers would place plainly excessive demands
on limited governmental resources is alone a good enough reason for rejecting it.”).
125. In the D.C. Circuit’s view, “once EPA defines or quantifies a State’s good
neighbor obligation, the State must have a reasonable time to implement that
requirement [before being issued a FIP].” See EME HCG Circuit Court Decision,
supra note 80, at 31. According to the circuit court, accepting the EPA’s interpretation
of the Good Neighbor Provision would mean that “a State’s only chance to avoid FIPs
is to make a successful stab in the dark.” Id. at 36. Cf. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2442
(reasoning that the EPA should have “interpret[ed] ‘any air pollutant’ in the permitting
triggers of PSD and Title V to encompass only pollutants emitted in quantities that
enable them to be sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to exclude . . .
pollutants[] like greenhouse gases”) (emphasis added).
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In further support of its decision on EME Homer’s first issue, the
Court rejected petitioners’ argument that the EPA’s failure to harmonize
the Tailoring Rule with its prior interpretations of the Good Neighbor
Provision made it unreasonable.126 In contrast, the Utility Air Court
pointed to inconsistency with prior statutory constructions as a major
indicator that the EPA’s most recent interpretation was unreasonable.127
Significantly, the past EPA judgments at issue in EME Homer were of the
same nature as those in Utility Air, construing more narrowly a particular
CAA provision in order to mitigate difficulties in implementing and
enforcing the related.128 This direct parallel makes it quite likely that
Utility Air’s rationale would have led the EME Homer Court to conclude
that the Transport Rule constituted an unreasonable interpretation on the
basis of its incongruity with past EPA constructions.
Finally, with regard to the issue of cost consideration under the Good
Neighbor Provision, application of Utility Air’s reasoning would likely
have led to a contrary result once again. Here, comparative analysis
illustrates the functional difference between applying Chevron as two
discrete steps and applying it as a collapsed single-step reasonableness
inquiry. Explicitly differentiating Chevron’s two steps, the EME Homer
majority first found the Good Neighbor Provision ambiguous, at step one,
as to the allocation of responsibility amongst multiple upwind States
contributing significantly to nonattainment in a single downwind State;129
then, at step two, the Court held that considering costs—or, as the EPA
characterized it: “in terms of the language, ‘contribute significantly,’ . . .
constru[ing] that term to include a component of difficulty of

126. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1601–02 (“Whatever pattern the Agency followed
in its [prior rules], EPA retained discretion to alter its course.”). Specifically,
respondents had noted that, in regard to similar rules calling for a reduction of
pollution by upwind States, the EPA had allowed a grace period subsequent to
quantification of the States’ regulatory obligations during which the States had an
opportunity to formulate adequate SIPs. See id. (citing Tr. Of Oral Arg. 37–39, 42–
43, 45–46).
127. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2440 (“It takes some cheek for EPA to insist that it
cannot possibly give ‘air pollutant’ a [non-GHG-inclusive] meaning in the PSD and
Title V contexts when it has been doing precisely so for decades.”).
128. In EME Homer, the past judgments construed more narrowly the Good
Neighbor Provision, for the purpose of lessening the practical difficulties faced by
states in being required to propose a SIP without any quantitative guidance. See supra
note 141 and accompanying text. In Utility Air, the past judgments more narrowly
construed the term “any air pollutant” for the purpose of lessening the practical
difficulty of subjecting the innumerable sources of less harmful emissions to “an
elaborate, burdensome permitting process” not designed to apply to such sources. See
Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2439–40.
129. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1604.
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achievement,” with cost being that component130—was a reasonable
method of allocating this responsibility.131
Although framing its disagreement with this holding in terms different
than a one-step vs. two-step Chevron issue, Justice Scalia’s dissent
expressed articulately the manner in which EME Homer’s outcome might
differ under a single-step analysis. As Justice Scalia wrote:
[T]he statute does not focus on whether the upwind state has
“achieved [compliance] significantly”; it asks whether the State
has “contributed significantly” to downwind pollution. The
provision addresses the physical effects of physical causes, and it
is only the magnitude of the relationship sufficient to trigger
regulation that admits of some vagueness. Stated differently, the
statute is ambiguous as to how much of a contribution to
downwind pollution is “significant,” but it is not at all ambiguous
as to whether factors unrelated to the amounts of pollutants that
make up a contribution affect the analysis.132
As the dissent suggests, under a two-step Chevron analysis, the
unfortunate potential arises for a court’s consideration of the first step to
become divorced from its consideration of the second step.133 Conversely,
this concern is somewhat alleviated under a single-step inquiry because,
by this method, the agency’s construction is considered specifically in
relation to the ambiguous language at issue. The dissent, seemingly
acknowledging this sentiment, gives an eloquent explanation of its
significance to the matter at hand:
Just as “[i]t does not matter whether the word ‘yellow’ is
ambiguous when the agency has interpreted it to mean ‘purple,’”
130. Tr. Of Oral Arg. 9. In support of this interpretation, petitioners’ explained that
“in common parlance, we might say that dunking a basketball is a more significant
achievement for somebody who is 5 feet 10 than for somebody who is 6 feet 10.” Id.
(emphasis added).
131. Id. at 1606–07.
132. Id. at 1611 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (final two emphases in original).
133. It should be emphasized that the Chevron Court did specify that the first step
in this methodology is, in fact, to inquire as to the presence of ambiguity with respect
to “the precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S.at 842 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the risk that the logic applied at each of Chevron’s two steps may
become divorced is perhaps best categorized as an issue resulting from the
misapplication of Chevron, rather than from the doctrine itself or from its own
dichotomy or non-dichotomy between its two steps. However, as evidenced here, the
separation of Chevron’s inquiry into two discreet steps does give rise to the significant
potential for reviewing judges—whether inadvertently or subconsciously, or by
deliberate legal sleight-of-hand—to obfuscate the relationship between the
appropriate considerations to be assessed at each step.
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it does not matter whether the phrase “amounts which . . .
contribute significantly [to downwind NAAQS nonattainment]” is
ambiguous when EPA has interpreted it to mean “amounts which
are inexpensive to eliminate.134
The problem lies in the fact, lost in the dichotomy between Chevron’s
two steps, that even if the term “contribute significantly” is ambiguous, it
might not be ambiguous as to its exclusion of cost-consideration.135
Though the effect of this particular conflict between EME Homer and
Utility Air is less determinative of the issue’s outcome, it is nevertheless
indicative of the divergent analyses’ potential to produce antithetical
results.
As this doctrinal inversion evidences, Utility Air did not differ from
EME Homer in a merely hypothetical or theoretical sense, nor did the
differences in its rationale bear simply minor or ancillary effects when
applied in lieu of those relied upon in EME Homer. Rather, these
differences effected a distinct, tangible difference in the cases’ outcomes.
2. Utility Air Under Traditional Chevron Analysis
Application of EME Homer’s methodology to the circumstances at
issue in Utility Air would likewise bear directly on the case’s outcome. As
with the hypothetical in Part III.A.i., nearly all of the reasoning underlying
the Court’s decision in Utility Air fails when judged under the standards
set forth in EME Homer.
In finding the EPA’s GHG-inclusive construction of the term “any air
pollutant” unreasonable as applied to the CAA’s PSD and Title V
permitting programs, the Court placed significant emphasis on several
lines of reasoning. First, and undoubtedly most prominent among these,
the Court repeatedly stressed the undesirable consequences and
implausibility of implementing the Triggering Rule as confirmation of the

134. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1612 (quoting U.S. v. Home Concrete &
Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1847, n.1 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
135. See id. (“It would be extraordinary for . . . use of the single word
‘significantly,’ to transmogrify a statute that assigns responsibility on the basis of
the amounts of pollutants emitted into a statute authorizing EPA to reduce
interstate pollution in the manner that it believes most efficient.”).
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rule’s unreasonableness.136 This rationale stands in stark contrast to EME
Homer’s markedly stricter adherence to traditional textual construction. In
EME Homer, the Court explained that “[t]he practical difficulties [in a
rule’s application] do not justify departure from the Act’s plain text.”137
With respect to the rules at issue in Utility Air, not only does the CAA’s
plain text (“any air pollutant”), support the EPA’s GHG-inclusive
construction, but the Court itself has previously held that the Act-wide
definition of “any air pollutant” includes GHGs.138 Owing, then, to the fact
that EME Homer held textual support for the EPA’s position to be
dispositive at Chevron’s first step,139 it follows that, under EME Homer,
the Triggering Rule would have likewise been upheld.
Next, the second major basis for the Court’s decision in Utility Air was
the failure of the Triggering Rule to comport with the EPA’s past
interpretations of the relevant provision.140 According to the Court, “[i]t
takes some cheek for EPA to insist that it cannot possibly give ‘air
pollutant’ a [more narrow meaning] in the PSD and Title V contexts when
it has been doing precisely that for decades.”141 Again, EME Homer
explicitly rejected this logic, as the Court, there, explicitly dismissed an

136. See, e.g., Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2443 (“The fact that EPA’s greenhousegas-inclusive interpretation of the PSD and Title V triggers would place plainly
excessive demands on limited governmental resources is alone a good reason for
rejecting it.”); id. (describing “the calamitous consequences” of the EPA’s
interpretation); id. at 2436 (“[The Rule] would . . . touch every household in the
land, yet still be relatively ineffective at reducing greenhouse gas concentrations”)
(internal quotation omitted). Further examples of this reasoning abound.
137. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1601–02.
138. See Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2439; Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528–29.
Although the Act-wide definition of “any air pollutant” at issue in Massachusetts
is not the precise instance of the term at issue in Utility Air, the fact that the Court
found that “[t]he statute is unambiguous,” id., as to the inclusion of GHGs in the
Act-wide definition of the term is strong, if not dispositive evidence that the plain
text of the Act supports the EPA’s position. In fact, the Court, in Utility Air, more
or less acknowledges as much, explaining that GHGs are “indisputably [included
in the category of] ‘pollutant[s] subject to regulation.’” Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at
2449 n.9. Ironically, despite holding the EPA’s interpretation of “any air
pollutant” unreasonable due to its inclusion of GHGs, the Court places GHGs
“indisputably” into an even narrower category. Indeed, making the textual
argument that GHGs are a pollutant subject to regulation is difficult without first
conceding that they are, in fact, a pollutant in the first place. These interpretive
inconsistencies are further evidence of the fact that the Utility Air Court divorced
its logic from Chevron and traditional textual analysis in favor of a more
comprehensive set of considerations.
139. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1600 (“the text of the statute supports EPA’s
position”).
140. See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text.
141. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2440.
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identical argument.142 Under EME Homer, the EPA’s past constructions
of “any air pollutant” as not including GHGs would not preclude its
subsequent GHG-inclusive interpretation of the term, nor would these past
alternative constructions lend weight to the argument that the Triggering
Rule was an impermissible construction of the CAA.143
Finally, the Utility Air Court repeatedly emphasized that, in the
context of the PSD and Title V permitting programs, construing the term
“any air pollutant” to include GHGs was “incompatible . . . with those
programs’ regulatory structure.”144 Analogously, in the appellate court
decision ultimately overturned in EME Homer, the D.C. Circuit reasoned
that the SIP/FIP provisions of the CAA “establishe[d] a partnership
between EPA and the states,” by which “EPA sets the standards, but the
States bear primary responsibility for attaining, maintaining, and enforcing
these standards.”145 The circuit court held that the EPA’s Transport Rule
was “incompatible with . . . the structure of the Clean Air Act” because,
by failing to give states quantitative guidance or a reasonable opportunity
to propose an adequate SIP, it effectively usurped the regulatory autonomy
reserved for the states, thereby violating this so-called “partnership.”146
The D.C. Circuit’s argument that the Transport Rule was an impermissible
interpretation of the CAA on the grounds that it was incompatible with the
Act’s structure was ultimately rejected by the Court in its reversal of the
D.C. Circuit—despite the fact that this reasoning is essentially identical to
the Supreme Court’s own reasoning in Utility Air.147 Yet again, this
analytical difference is emblematic of the substantial likelihood that

142. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1601–02 (“Whatever pattern the Agency
followed in its [past rules], EPA retained discretion to alter its course.”).
143. Id. at 1602 (explaining that because the EPA was “[e]ndeavoring to
satisfy the D.C. Circuit’s directive [in a prior case] . . . . [the Court] cannot
condemn EPA’s decision” on the present matter). Ironically, this is yet another
line of logic conflicting directly with Utility Air. There, the Court reasoned that
its own prior determination that the term “any air pollutant” included GHGs did
not lend support to the reasonableness of the EPA’s similar construction of the
term. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2439 (noting that “[i]n Massachusetts, the Court
held that the Act-wide definition [of ‘air pollutant’] includes greenhouse gases,”
but still reaching an ultimate conclusion that the EPA’s GHG-inclusive
construction was unreasonable).
144. Id. at 2442. See also, e.g., id. at 2443 (“[W]e think it beyond reasonable
debate that [the Triggering Rule] would be incompatible with the substance of
Congress’ regulatory scheme”).
145. EME Homer, 696 F.3d at 29–30.
146. Id. at 33.
147. See EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1600–1601 (acknowledging the circuit
court’s argument, but still finding that “nothing in the statute places EPA under
an obligation to provide specific metrics to States before they undertake to fulfill
their good neighbor obligations”).
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application of EME Homer’s reasoning would have led the Court to a different
decision in Utility Air.
In short, the Triggering Rule would have been exceedingly unlikely to be
deemed an impermissible construction of the CAA had it been assessed under
EME Homer. This dissimilarity in outcome results from the Court’s
underlying willingness to consider the totality of the circumstances with
which it was faced in Utility Air, and its reciprocal observance of black-letter
Chevron analysis in EME Homer. This doctrinal cause-and-effect relationship
is equally evident in the previous assessment of the Triggering Rule.148
IV. RECONCILING THE COURT’S CONFLICTING DOCTRINE
The inconsistency and uncertainty in judicial review created by the
Supreme Court’s contradictory holdings is problematic in and of itself, as it
leaves the validity of any particular rule up to the EPA’s best guess.149 The
greater problem, however, lies in the resulting demand placed on the EPA to
draft regulations with primary consideration not of the intent of Congress, but
of what it believes courts will uphold.150 Furthermore, both the highly
complex, technical nature of the CAA and the increasing impetus for climate
change regulation exacerbate the negative consequences potentiated by this
uncertainty. While the CAA’s complexity amplifies the need for judicial

148. See Part III.A.2.
149. See William N. Eskridge Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1038, 1157 (2008) (noting that “the Supreme Court itself is not
settled as to what is the correct approach to agency statutory interpretations,” and that
“whatever approach the Court says it is following, the Justices will tend to be ad hoc
in their actual practice”).
150. See Reeves & Logan, EPA Takes Steps to Shore up Legal Basis for Power
Plant GHG Rule, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY REPORT (June 6, 2014) (explaining that
recently, the EPA has focused in large part on “insulating [its] proposed rules from
fundamental legal attack” by giving “alternative definition[s] in an effort to have at
least one upheld by federal courts”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in
the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the
Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 76-79 (2000) (“[T]he sort of careful
deliberation and drafting that legislators might use to guide judicial interpretation will
be wasted on an administrative agency. The agency will tend to choose among
reasonable interpretive options based on political considerations and policy concerns
rather than anything in Congress’ statute.”).
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review151 by expanding the range of possible interpretations of ambiguities,152
it simultaneously increases the importance of technical and scientific expertise
in their interpretation, paradoxically encouraging heightened deference to the
EPA.153 That these effects are at competition with one another is axiomatic:
Greater need for deference to agency interpretations undoubtedly enhances
the risk that agencies might overstep the bounds of their authority, which, in
turn, increases the importance of the reviewing court’s role in keeping agency
authority in check.154 Accordingly, in addressing the problem created by the
Court’s current doctrinal conflict, any potential solution will only be
beneficial to the extent that it strikes a balance between these countervailing
interests.
But how can such a balance be struck? Would it not be prudent to simply
choose one of the Court’s two methodologies and “stick to it?” Answering
these questions requires a closer look at the two aforementioned competing
interests as they relate to the Court’s analyses in EME Homer and Utility Air,
respectively.

151. See Sunstein, supra note 40, at 2088 (“Often the regulatory process is
confounded by the difficulty of coordinating numerous statutes with one another”).
152. See Stevenson & Vermule, supra note 53, at 601 (“statutory language . . . will
suggest to the reviewing court both a ‘best’ interpretation of the statute . . . and a range
of interpretations that are sufficiently plausible that the court would view them as
reasonable, though not ideal”). The pair goes on to list a number of factors that
influence the size and scope of this range—or, as they put it, “the amount the court
would permit the agency to deviate from the court’s ideal reading—including the
language of the statute at issue and the court’s confidence in the agency’s expertise,
among others. Id. at 601 n.19 (“The size of the zone need not be fixed by the statute
itself; the amount of interpretive latitude the court gives the agency—the amount the
court would permit the agency to deviate from the court’s ideal reading—may depend
in part on other factors, such as the court’s confidence in the agency’s expertise, its
sympathy for the agency’s policy goals, or its assessment of the importance of the
interpretive issue.”)
153. See Sunstein, supra note 40, at 2095 (“[D]eference [i]s appropriate [where]
the agency’s competence [i]s highly relevant”). Cf. id. at 2085 (1990) (“[T]he text and
background of the [Administrative Procedure Act] suggest a firm belief in the need
for judicial checks on administration, particularly with respect to the interpretation of
law”); Thomas Jefferson Univiersity v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994) (“[B]road
deference [to agency’s statutory interpretations] is all the more warranted when, as
here, the regulation concerns a complex and highly technical regulatory program, in
which the identification and classification of relevant criteria necessarily require
significant expertise and entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns”)
(internal quotations omitted).
154. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State After Chevron, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 487-88 (describing
“the Court’s long struggle to reconcile the growth of agencies with the Constitution”
as having been “far more complex” than anticipated”) (1989).
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A. The Problem with Picking “One or the Other”
First, EME Homer’s pointed focus on the need for agencies to fill
statutory gaps is made clear by the Court’s by-the-book adherence to Chevron,
its emphasis on strict statutory construction, and its common-sense approach
to determining congressional intent.155 The Court specifically stressed that,
“[b]ecause a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy . . .
depend[s] upon more than ordinary knowledge of the situation, the
administering agency’s [reasonable] construction is to be accorded
controlling weight.”156 Corresponding to the considerable importance it
placed on the need for agency expertise in statutory interpretation, the
Court’s opinion in EME Homer afforded reciprocally little consideration
to the need to “police” the EPA or keep its authority in check.157
In contrast, the need to keep the EPA’s authority in check was precisely
the interest that the Court’s opinion in Utility Air weighed most heavily; the
Court’s citation to Brown & Williamson clearly signals this priority. As
discussed supra, the Utility Air majority supported its determination that the
EPA had unreasonably construed the CAA by repeatedly noting that the
Triggering Rule would greatly expand the Agency’s regulatory authority.158
In fact, Utility Air placed so much emphasis on the need to keep the EPA’s
power in check that it essentially required that the EPA divorce its
interpretation from the plain meaning of the statutory language. And, as in
EME Homer, the Court’s strident protection of one particular interest in Utility
155. See generally Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s
Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2300 (2006) (“Congress would prefer
agencies rather than courts to have binding authority to resolve residual [statutory]
ambiguities”).
156. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1603 (internal quotations omitted).
157. Id. at 1601 (“The practical difficulties cited by the Court of Appeals do
not justify departure from the Act’s plain text”). One of these “difficulties cited
by the Court of Appeals[,]” id., was the concern that, by way of the Transport
Rule, the EPA was usurping a considerable amount of the regulatory autonomy
typically reserved for the States under the relevant portions of the CAA. EME
HCG Circuit Court Decision, supra note 66, at 29–30.
158. See supra, notes 103–107 and accompanying text (detailing the enormous
effect the Triggering Rule would have on the EPA’s regulatory authority). See
also, e.g., Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2442 (“[A]pplying the PSD and Title V
permitting requirements to greenhouse gases would be inconsistent with—in fact,
would overthrow—the Act’s structure and design. In the Tailoring Rule, the EPA
described the calamitous consequences of interpreting the Act in that way”); id.
at 2443 (explaining that, where it previously regulated about 800 sources under
the PSD program and 15,000 under Title V, the rule would result in expansion of
the number of sources over which the EPA had regulatory authority to 82,000 and
6.1 million, respectively). The Court further noted that the increase in the
Agency’s authority was so great that it would “necessitate[] as much as a 1,000fold increase in the permitting-thresholds set forth in the statute.” Id.
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Air dictated a corresponding de-emphasis on furtherance of the other.
Particularly, in placing strong priority on its role in preventing agency
overreach, the Utility Air majority discounted the importance of the role of
agency experts—or, as the Court described them in EME Homer: those
holding “a full understanding of the statutory policy . . . [and] more than
ordinary knowledge of the situation”159—in interpreting ambiguities in
technically complex statutes.160
Having established the particular interests underlying the holdings in
Utility Air and EME Homer, determining whether either of these holdings’
respective methodology should be “chosen” as the predominant
adjudicative strategy moving forward becomes simple. It is no coincidence
that Utility Air, in deemphasizing the importance of deference to agency
expertise, cited to Brown & Williamson in support for its employment of
an overarching reasonableness test.161 The Court’s choice to look beyond
the text of the statute reflects the policy concerns at the heart of Brown &
Williamson: Where an agency interpretation holds potentially vast
political or economic consequences—or, in other words, where the courts’
role in policing agencies is most important—courts should apply a more
comprehensive test to assess whether the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable.
It seems fairly safe to conclude that the Court’s quasi totality-of-thecircumstances analysis in Utility Air did, in fact, produce the right result.
Notably, the Court’s invalidation of the Triggering Rule prevented
burdensome permitting requirements “finely crafted for thousands, not
millions, of sources” from being thrust upon approximately 6.1 million
sources.162 It additionally/further precluded the swell of administrative
costs from around $74 million to over $22 billion163 and averted “decadelong delays in issuing permits” which would have caused “construction
projects to grind to a halt nationwide.”164
However, the likely consequences of the EPA’s Triggering Rule were
both easily quantifiable and patently extreme. This certainty of impact
played the crucial role of mitigating the usual risks associated with
brushing aside the need for expert resolution of statutory ambiguities.
159. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1603 (internal quotation omitted).
160. See Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2439–40 (explaining the Court’s own view
as to how the EPA should have construed the CAA provision at issue); id. at 2442
(emphasizing that “there is no insuperable textual barrier to EPA’s interpreting
‘any air pollutant’ [more narrowly]” at what was purportedly the first step of
Chevron analysis).
161. See supra, Part II.B.2 (detailing the wide range of factors guiding the
Court’s assessment of the Triggering Rule).
162. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2443–44.
163. Id. at 2442–43.
164. Id. at 2443.
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Applying the Utility Air methodology in assessing a highly technical and
complex issue not characterized by such glaringly dire consequences
would effectively give the reviewing court nearly as much authority as the
agency to interpret the statute165 despite the obvious disparity in the
technical expertise possessed by the two bodies.166 The comparative
analysis of the Transport Rule under Utility Air’s reasoning, discussed
supra, illustrates this problem quite clearly.167 The risk—inherent in
across-the-board application of Utility Air—of giving courts such broad
discretion in this context raises concerns not only due to courts’ general
lack of knowledge on scientific and technical issues, but also because it
essentially removes any concrete framework by which courts are bound in
answering questions that are often intrinsically political in nature.168
Simply put, applying Utility Air to every challenge to CAA-based rules
would allow courts to effectively usurp authority reserved for agencies on
account of their expertise. Furthermore, doing so would unreasonably bog
down the regulatory process by forcing agencies to tailor their rules to the
sensibilities of courts rather than congressional intent.169
Similarly, the value the Court placed on the broad discretion of agency
expertise in EME Homer seems to have led to an agreeable result. The EME
Homer Court—essentially tasked with choosing between the EPA’s and the
165. Cf. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126
(“[A reviewing court’s] task is to apply the text [of the statute] not to improve
upon it”).
166. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, CHEVRON’S NONDELEGATION
DOCTRINE, 2001 S. CT. REV. 201, 203–05 (explaining that deference to agencies
is especially important “in light of the many and fluctuating considerations,
usually best known to the agency itself”); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalada,
supra note 153, at 512 (“[B]road deference [to agency’s statutory interpretations]
is all the more warranted when, as here, the regulation concerns a complex and
highly technical regulatory program, in which the identification and classification
of relevant criteria necessarily require significant expertise and entail the exercise
of judgment grounded in policy concerns”) (internal quotations omitted).
167. See supra, Part III.A.1.
168. See Molot, supra note 155 (“[A]genc[ies] will tend to choose among
reasonable interpretive options based on political considerations and policy
concerns”). Cf. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 172 (explaining that agencies
are better suited to make these political and policy related determinations because
“Congress would prefer agencies rather than courts to have binding authority to
resolve residual [statutory] ambiguities,” and that “the best explanation for this is
that executive branch officials are endowed with presumptive constitutional
authority . . . to complete an ambiguous statutory scheme unless Congress
specifies otherwise”) (emphasis added).
169. At least some members of the Court have alluded to this notion,
emphasizing “the different institutional competencies of agencies and courts” and
noting that “agencies [not courts] are experts at statutory implementation.”
Neguise, supra note 43, at 530 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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D.C. Circuit’s interpretations of a CAA ambiguity—did not overlook the fact
that the provision at issue was highly scientifically complex in determining
which interpretation should control.170 The Court pointed out that the linkages
in the data “with which EPA had to contend [in making its determination]
number[ed] in the thousands,”171 that the “EPA conducted complex modeling
to establish the combined effect the upwind reductions projected at each cost
threshold would have on air quality in downwind States.”172 Furthermore,
even given the extensive lengths to which the EPA went in deciding how to
frame its rule, the Court acknowledged that “a degree of imprecision is
inevitable in tackling the problem of interstate air pollution.”173 Recognizing
this scientific complexity, the EME Homer Court ultimately concluded that
the “EPA must have leeway in fulfilling its statutory mandate” and therefore
upheld the Transport Rule.174
In this sense, the Transport Rule provides a pristine example of why
agencies are generally far better equipped than courts to interpret the statutes
they are tasked with enforcing—the very reason that granting deference to
agency interpretations on complex matters is often prudent. However, in
giving considerable leeway to the EPA, the EME Homer Court placed little
emphasis on the importance of its role in preventing agencies from asserting
excessive authority. Viewing the Triggering Rule through the lens of EME
Homer’s reasoning displays conspicuously the risks associated with this
omission.175 Indeed, it is not difficult to conclude that EME Homer’s reliance
on the plain meaning of statutory text and rejection of other, extratextual
considerations such as the “practical difficulties” of implementing the
Triggering Rule could lead to particularly adverse consequences if applied in
a Utility Air-like circumstance where the most prominent indications of a
regulation’s unreasonableness are the actual effects of that statutory
construction.176
170. See supra, Part II.B.1 (detailing the particular challenges at issue in EME
Homer).
171. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1594.
172. Id. at 1596.
173. Id. at 1609.
174. Id.
175. See supra, Part III.A.2 (reasoning that the Triggering Rule would likely
have been upheld under an EME Homer analysis).
176. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996) (warning that
the uncertainty in “[t]he present [agency law doctrine] contradicts a major premise of
our constitutional scheme and of contemporary separation of powers case law that a
fusion of lawmaking and law-exposition is especially dangerous to our liberties”);
Jerry L Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance, 152–153 (1997) (warning against
giving overly broad deference to agency interpretations and explaining, “If
congressional statutes were truly specific with respect to the actions that
administrators were to take, presidential politics would be a mere beauty contest”).
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The necessary conclusion, then, is that neither EME Homer nor Utility
Air should govern every challenge to the EPA’s CAA authority. The
likelihood of drastically negative consequences under either methodology
renders both unsavory as universal solutions. Nevertheless, the pertinent
lesson here lies in the fact that each of these competing doctrines do produce
seemingly beneficial results in particular circumstances. Only by accurately
identifying these circumstances can a workable solution to the doctrinal
conflict be obtained.
Clearly, application of EME Homer’s logic to legal circumstances such
as those presented in Utility Air produces far-from-ideal results. But what
were the precise legal circumstances that colored the Court’s decision in
Utility Air? What particular aspects of the EPA’s Triggering Rule would allow
it to pass muster under the plain meaning of the CAA despite the nearcatastrophic effects that would result? Better yet, what aspects of the CAA
provision would allow a rule to produce such consequences despite clearly
fitting the plain meaning of its language to produce such dire consequences?
Answering these questions will illuminate an effective solution to the
doctrinal conflict at hand.
A. The GHG vs. Non-GHG Distinction
Luckily, in light of the preceding analysis of the CAA, CAA
jurisprudence, and related administrative law policy concerns, these answers
are not so difficult to find. Simply put, the efficacy of the EME Homer and
Utility Air’s competing rationales in the circumstances in which they were
applied—and the sheer disaster risked by their application in the alternative
circumstances—stems from the fact that Utility Air’s Triggering Rule
implicated one ingredient that EME Homer and the Transport Rule lacked:
greenhouse gases.
In 1990, when Congress passed the most recent revision of the CAA,
legislators did not plan for the Act, as written, to serve as a vehicle for
regulating GHG emissions or combatting climate change.177 As such, the fit
of the statutory language to GHG regulations can be imprecise. In particular,

177. See 68 Fed. Reg. 52922-02 (Sept. 8, 2003) (“Only the research and
development provision of the CAA—section 103—specifically mentions CO2,
and the legislative history of that section indicates that Congress was focused on
seeking a sound scientific basis on which to make future decisions on global
climate change, not regulation under the CAA as it was being amended.”)
(emphasis added); Advanced Notice, supra note 25, at 44,355 (setting out the
EPA’s opinion that the CAA is “an outdated law . . . [which] is ill-suited for the
task of regulating global greenhouse gases”).
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problems arise in applying the CAA’s numerous “triggering” provisions,178
which go into effect according to specific, statutorily-determined,
numerical emissions thresholds. Because these thresholds were
established in consideration of “conventional pollutants” that tend to be
emitted in quantities “orders of magnitude” less than GHGs,179 the
resulting disparity leaves many portions of the CAA entirely unworkable
when applied to GHGs.180
The true complication arises, however, from the fact that many provisions
in the CAA, by the plain meaning of their language, can reasonably be
construed to apply to GHGs.181 The fact that Congress, in drafting the CAA’s
particular language and setting its quantitative thresholds, did not anticipate
the extension of that language or those thresholds to apply to GHGs is
precisely the reason that EME Homer’s logic cannot be applied in situations
analogous to those at issue in Utility Air. Strict application of Chevron’s twostep test would allow for a rule like the Triggering Rule slip through the
doctrine’s adjudicative cracks. Essentially, the nature of the CAA makes it so
that, sometimes, the only way to prevent a potentially harmful GHG-centric
rule from being upheld is to take into consideration factors beyond the mere
words and numbers set forth in the CAA.182
The essence of the problem at hand lies in the fact that Chevron’s
traditional two-step form is not built to deal with statutory language rendered
178. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C) (2012)
(requiring a permit for new sources with the potential to emit 250 tons per year of
“any air pollutant”); Id. at § 7475(a)(4) (requiring new sources subject to the PSD
permitting program to comply with BACT “for each pollutant subject to regulation
[under the Act]”). Essentially, two triggers come into play here: First, should the EPA
issues a report classifying a new substance as an “air pollutant,” that classification
would trigger the application of the PSD permitting program to sources with the
potential to emit 250 tons per year of that pollutant; second, should the EPA issue a
regulation of a new substance, that regulation would trigger every source subject to
the PSD program to be subject to mandatory compliance with BACT.
179. Advanced Notice, supra note 25, at 44,498–99.
180. See Sunstein, supra note 40, at 2090 (“[R]egulation often runs into difficulty
because of the complex systemic effects of regulatory controls. Statutes interact in
surprising ways with markets, other statutes, and other problems. Unanticipated
consequences are common”).
181. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(1) (making subject to
regulation sources with the potential to emit 250 tons of “any air pollutant”). This
issue—and this particular provision—served as the basis for Utility Air.
182. See Sunstein, supra note 40, at 2087–89 (explaining that “Chevron is best
understood and defended . . . [as] involv[ing] extratextual considerations of various
kinds, including how a statute is best or most sensibly implemented,” because
“[s]ometimes regulation is made more difficult because of the pervasive problem of
changed circumstances,” and “Congress is unable to amend every statute to account
for those who must apply the statute”); Id. at 2089 (“Congress cannot possibly forsee
all of the problems to be dealt with under broad statutory terms”).
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problematic due to changing circumstances.183 This shortcoming explains
why EME Homer yields less-than-ideal results when applied to GHG-related
rules. Instead, considerations beyond those associated with a strict Chevron
analysis become crucial in this context, as courts are capable of responding
more quickly and fluidly to changing circumstances than legislators.184
Furthermore, as beneficial as the Utility Air approach may be in
helping to prevent the promulgation of textually supported but potentially
harmful rules, it is equally beneficial in the opposite sense. Oftentimes, the
same changes in circumstance that necessitate regulation can, themselves,
cause that very “regulation [to] fail[] because of the excessive rigidity of
statutory commands.”185 When reviewing such regulations, consideration
of factors beyond mere statutory text can produce more favorable results.
Administrative law scholar Cass Sunstein lists the CAA’s “best available
technology” provisions as a prime example of how a statute’s textual
rigidity can make effective regulation difficult in light of changing
circumstances.186 In fact, one of these very provisions—the BACT
requirement—took center stage in Utility Air, where the Court upheld the
EPA’s rule specifically on the basis of its likely real-world effects/nontextual factors.187
By their very nature, the problems created by GHG regulation under
the CAA can be solved only by applying Utility Air’s extratextual, totality
of the circumstances approach. However, this necessity does not lessen the
risks associated with applying Utility Air outside of the context of GHG
regulation. Because the root of the problem with the Court’s conflicting
holdings is centered specifically on the regulation of GHGs, the solution
to the quandary of how to resolve this conflict should likewise be a
particularized one centered on the regulation of GHGs. Although Utility
Air is exceptionally useful in this specific context, the distinct need for
183. See Id. at 2089 (explaining that, when facing such a problem, “tak[ing]
changed circumstances into consideration[] seems to be a valuable if partial
corrective”).
184. See id. at 2088 (“the common law process has a significant advantage
over legislation in its capacity to respond to changing conditions and mores”). Cf.
Cross, supra note 81, at 2001 (explaining that, although it is not at all uncommon
for the Court to use non-traditional methods of statutory interpretation, “[i]t is
impossible to determine, though whether this pluralism is sincere (using the best
methods for each case) or strategic (using the methods that conform to the
Justice’s ideologically preferred outcome)”).
185. Sunstein, supra note 40, at 2089.
186. Id. at 2089 n.87.
187. Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2448–49 (explaining that the EPA’s
interpretation of the BACT provision “is not so disastrously unworkable . . . as to
convince us that EPA’s interpretation is unreasonable” because “the record before
[the Court] does not establish that the BACT provision as written is incapable of
being sensibly applied to greenhouse gases”).
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expert-driven statutory interpretation remains—particularly in light of the
CAA’s technically complex nature and the science underlying its
provisions. Accordingly, Utility Air should be followed in reviewing
GHG-related rules, while EME Homer should control with regard nonGHG rules. This solution serves to concurrently maximize the requisite
deference to the EPA’s interpretations of the CAA and the flexibility
necessary to deal with the paramount need for GHG regulation under a law
whose language makes it exceedingly difficult to do so. At the same time,
this strategy minimizes both the danger of giving courts too much
authority to impose their own statutory constructions and the risk of
allowing agencies to unreasonably expand their own authority.
CONCLUSION
Climate change, being of pressing importance, demands immediate
attention. The suggestions set forth in this comment serve to enhance the
EPA’s ability to provide timely and effective countermeasures, while
simultaneously mitigating the risks associated with other particular
courses of action. Short of amending the CAA, the competing interests
underlying administrative law as a whole—deferring to agency expertise
while preserving the judiciary’s authority to check agency—make finding
a complete solution to the issue considered in this comment implausible.
Nevertheless, applying the methodology advanced in Utility Air to the
adjudication of GHG-related rules, and retaining that of EME Homer for
the review of non-GHG rules, comes substantially close to doing so. Here,
both competing administrative law interests and the importance of
doctrine that allows for effective climate change regulation are given
maximum priority. Indeed, tackling this issue will take the cooperation of
many—and this doctrinal compromise is a firm step in the right direction.
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